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A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Conservation Reserve Program Participation 
under Uncertainty 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper develops theoretical and empirical models to understand how farmers formulate their 
participation  strategies  when  deciding  to  enroll  in  the Conservation  Reserve  Program  (CRP) 
under uncertainty. A theoretical model is employed to obtain the impacts of various factors on 
the optimal bidding strategies. A selectivity-based econometric model is then used to estimate 
the  probability  of  enrollment  and  determinants  of  rental  payments.  The  theoretical  results 
indicate  that  the  optimal  bid  is  positively  related  to  the  expected  farming  income  and 
environmental benefit scores, and it is negatively related to the degree of risk aversion and the 
variability of returns. The econometric model shows that land benefits, land attributes, farmer 
characteristics, and variability of climate variables impact the enrollment probabilities and rental 
rates  received.  These  results  have  important  policy  implications  for  the  design  and 
implementation of conservation programs.   
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1. Introduction 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is a voluntary land retirement program that 
aims at protecting the nation’s most environmentally sensitive cropland. Farmers enter into 10- 
to 15-year contracts with U.S. Department of Agriculture and receive annual rental payments and 
cost-share assistance for establishing conservation practices in their land. The CRP enrolls land 
through a bidding process, in which contracts are accepted based on a county-level soil-specific 
maximum acceptable bid and an Environmental Benefit Index (EBI) that is composed of a set of 
environmental criteria
1. This index is then combined with the farmer’s bid (cost factor) to obtain 
the cost-adjusted index (the total EBI) and the rankings used to decide program participants 
(FSA). Each bidder is given a fact sheet about the scoring rules for each environmental category, 
the total environmental scores, and the applicable bid cap, but not the cost factor. The formula 
for converting bids into the cost factor points as well as the weight of the cost factor in the total 
EBI are not known to farmers prior to the submission of bids.      
Several authors pointed out that the CRP has made some contributions in improving the 
quality of natural environment in the United States (Ribaudo; Feather, Hellerstein, and Hansen; 
Smith). However, there are still various concerns regarding the rationale in the bidding process, 
environmental effectiveness of the program, and determinants of land rental payments (GAO; 
Classen et al.; Yang and Isik; Khanna et al.). Because public policies are increasingly relying on 
the use of land retirement programs to achieve environmental policy goals, it is important to 
understand the factors affecting farmer participation and the determinants of rental rates received 
in the CRP. This information could be useful in improving the CRP bidding process, estimating 
the program costs, and examining and enhancing the cost-effectiveness of the program.   
                                                 
1 The environmental scores of EBI consist of six separate categories each expressing different attributes such as 
wildlife, water quality, soil erosion, enduring benefits, air quality, and state or national conservation priority area.   3 
Farmers’  enrollment  decisions  in  the  CRP  involve  various  sources  of  uncertainty. 
Especially,  a  farmer’s  bidding  strategy  is  influenced  by  two  sources  of  uncertainty;  farming 
income and the CRP bidding process and rules. The decision to participate in the CRP must be 
made in the face of the well-known revenue uncertainty of agricultural production resulting from 
variability in output prices and crop yields. Producers are also faced with uncertainty about the 
CRP bidding process and rules including their ignorance of the environmental scoring rules, 
combining scores to rank bidders, and other bidders’ strategies. In particular, they formulate their 
bidding  strategies  in  the  presence  of  uncertainty  about  the  trade-off  between  bids  and 
environmental scores and the weight of the cost factor in the total EBI.    
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of farmer decision-making to understand 
how farmers formulate their participation strategies when deciding to enroll in the CRP under 
uncertainty.  The  theoretical  model  determines  the  impacts  of  various  factors  on  the  optimal 
bidding strategies. A selectivity-based econometric model that incorporates land characteristics, 
farmer  attributes,  and  uncertainty  about  agricultural  production  is  then  used  to  estimate  the 
probability of enrollment in the CRP and determinants of rental payments received.   
Several empirical studies have examined the factors affecting farmer participation in the 
CRP and wetland reserve programs (Konyar and Osborn; McLean, Hui, and Joseph; Skaggs, 
Kirksey, and Harper; Kalaitzandonakes and Monson; Cooper and Osborn; Goodwin and Smith; 
Parks and Kramer)
2. Previous studies identified various factors affecting farmer participation in 
these programs. They pointed out that socioeconomic variables such as farmer tenure and age, 
economic factors such as returns and costs, bid cap, soil erosion rate, and location of counties 
influence  the  probability  of  the  CRP  participation.  Most  of  these  studies  employed  discrete 
                                                 
2  A  few  studies  examined  CRP  bidding  behavior  in  the  early  sign-up  periods  (Shoemaker;  Reichelderfer  and 
Boggess). They showed that asymmetric information about farmers learning the bid cap caused the submitted bids to 
approach the bid cap.   4 
choice  models  with  the  survey  data  to  examine  the  determinants  of  farmer  participation. 
However, these studies assume deterministic decision-making, and therefore do not take into 
account uncertainty and risk aversion of farmers in estimation of the participation probabilities.  
This analysis differs from the previous work in several ways. First, this study provides a 
comprehensive model of program participation under uncertainty to formulate farmers’ bidding 
strategies. Second, it utilizes a behavioral econometric model to estimate not only the factors 
affecting enrollment probabilities, but also the determinants of rental rates. Third, the analysis 
uses a national-level data set, instead of a single state or region, and considers various variables 
that are not considered by the previous studies and are likely to affect participation decision. 
Finally, it aims at determining the impacts of uncertainty about agricultural production on the 
participation  decision  and  rental  rates  received.  Thus,  this  paper  contributes  to  the  existing 
literature  on  the  CRP  participation  by  developing  a  framework  to  incorporate  uncertainty  in 
estimation of the enrollment probabilities and the determinants of rental rates received. 
The results from the theoretical model indicate that the optimal bid is positively related to 
the expected farming income and environmental benefits and negatively related to the degree of 
risk aversion and the variability of returns. The results from the econometric model show that 
land  benefits  and  attributes,  farmer  characteristics,  and  variability  of  climate  variables  have 
significant impacts on the enrollment probabilities and rental rates. Increases in production costs 
and  bid  caps,  and  decreases  in  value  of  crop  production  have  positive  impacts  on  the 
participation  decisions.  Lands  with  higher  EBI  have  a  higher  probability  of  enrollment  and 
higher  rental  rates.  The  variability  of  climate  variables  positively  impacts  the  enrollment 
probabilities  and  negatively  impacts  the  rental  rates  received.  These  results  have  important 
policy implications for conservation programs because public policies are increasingly relying on 
the use of land retirement and conversion programs to achieve environmental policy goals.     5 
2. Theoretical Model 
We develop a model to determine the factors affecting farmer participation in the CRP by 
extending the framework presented by Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort. Consider a 
risk-averse  farmer  who  decides  whether  to  participate  in  the  CRP  under  uncertainty  about 
agricultural returns. The farmer is assumed to have a von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function, 
U(W) defined on wealth W with  0 > W U  and  0 < WW U . The wealth is represented by the sum of 
the initial wealth ( 0 W ) and returns from crop production. The returns could be uncertain due to 
uncertainty about prices, crop yields and weather conditions. The per-acre expected return is 
represented as:  ) ; ( h p q E , where E is the expectation operator, q is the land quality and h  is the 
farmer  characteristics  such  as  age.  Let  the  per-acre  government  payments  received  be 
represented by  ) (q G . The farmer has the option to participate in the CRP and can receive per-
acre annual rental payments (V). Participation in the CRP creates non-stochastic income. The 
farmer is responsible for a portion of the annualized restoration costs,  ) ( ) 1 ( q K a - , and receives 
the remaining costs ( ) (q K a ) as incentive payments for participation. Thus, the landowner faces 
the choice of continuing production in the current land use, or converting it to the CRP land.   
We determine the minimum rental rate that a farmer requires to participate in the CRP. 
The farmer’s bidding strategy is guided by the notion of a maximum acceptable payment (B ), 
above which no bids will be accepted. Denote B as the unknown largest possible bid that the 
farmer  can  submit  and  win  acceptance  into  the  CRP.  Assume  that  each  farmer  forms 
expectations  about  B.  Farmers  are  informed  about  environmental  benefit  scores  (S)  of  their 
cropland before placing their bids. Therefore, we assume that the environmental scores have an 
effect on these expectations. The expectations, conditional on S, can be characterized by the 
density  function  ) | ( S B h , with a support on  [ ] B , 0 , where  B  is the bid cap. Here,  ) | ( S B h    6 
summarizes the farmer’s uncertainty about the CRP bidding process and rules, which results 
from the lack of knowledge about the environmental scoring rules, combining scores to rank 
bidders,  and  trade-off  between  bids  and  environmental  scores.  The  probability  that  a  bid  is 
accepted can be expressed as:  = £ ) | ( S B V P ) | ( 1 ) | ( S V H dB S B h
B
V
- = ￿ . The density  ) | ( S B h  is 
conditioned on S so that  [ ] B V S V H S V H S S , 0 ) | ( ) | (
2 1 2 1 Î " < ￿ >  (i.e.,  0
) | (
<
¶
¶
S
E V H
). 
Optimal Bidding Strategy under Uncertainty  
  The farmer will enroll in the CRP if the expected utility in case of participation in the 
CRP exceeds the expected utility without participation: 
( )[ ] ( )
( ) ) ( ) ; (
) | ( ) ( ) ; ( ) | ( 1 ) ( ) 1 (
0
0 0
q G q W EU
S V H q G q W EU S V H q K V W EU
+ + >
+ + + - - - +
h p
h p a
.                  (1) 
Equation (1) indicates that the balance between the net payoffs and the acceptance probability. A 
higher bid increases the net payoffs, but reduces the probability of winning, and vice versa. The 
farmer faces the problem of determining the optimal bid that can win acceptance into the CRP 
under uncertainty. To derive explicit analytical results, we replace the expected utility with the 
certainty  equivalent  income  as  in  Latacz-Lohmann  and  Van  der  Hamsvoort.  We  derive  the 
certainty equivalent income from the expected utility by obtaining the risk premium (R) from 
( )= + + ) ( ) ; ( 0 q G q W EU h p ( ) R q E W U - + ) ; ( 0 h p   (Isik).  Using  a  second-order  Taylor  series 
approximation, R at the mean wealth W  is obtained as:  2 ) ( ) ( ) ( p f Var W W R = , where  ) (p Var  
is the variance of the profit and  W WW U U W - = ) ( f  is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk 
aversion (Isik). Note that the risk premium under the CRP,  ) (V R , is zero because there is no 
uncertainty associated with the annual income received.   7 
The farmer’s decision is to determine the optimal bid as
3   
[ ][ ] ) | ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ( ) 1 ( S V H W R q G q E q K V Max
V - + - - - - = Y h p a .                               (2) 
The first-order condition is  
[ ] [ ] 0 ) ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) | ( ) | ( 1 = + - - - - - - W R q G q E q K V S V h S V H h p a .                         (3) 
The optimal bid formula is then determined from (3) as: 
[ ] [ ]
) | (
) | ( 1
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ; (
*
*
*
S V h
S V H
W R q K q G q E V
-
+ - - + + = a h p .                                     (4)    
This  solution  is  unique  maximum  if  B   exceeds 
* V   and  the  second-order  condition, 
+ = D ) | ( 2
* S V h [ ] 0 ) ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ( ) 1 (
) | ( *
*
*
> + - - - -
¶
¶
W R q G q E q K V
V
S V h
h p a , is satisfied.  
The  optimal  bid  in  (4)  compromises  the  sum  of  forgone  profits  ( ) ; ( h p q E ),  the 
government payments ( ) (q G ) and the restoration costs ( ) ( ) 1 ( q K a - ) minus the risk premium 
( ) (W R ) plus a premium ( [ ]
0
) | (
) | ( 1
*
*
>
-
S V h
S V H
). We can interpret the premium as the inverse of 
hazard rate or the inverse of the probability that a bid will be accepted in a short interval of V 
given that the bid has not exceeded the largest possible bid that can win acceptance previously 
(at 
* V ). The farmer’s entire uncertainty about the CRP bidding process adds the premium to the 
optimal  bid  as  a  mark-up  above  the  opportunity  cost  of  participation 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ; ( W R q K q G q E - - + + a h p ). When the opportunity cost exceeds the bid cap, the 
farmer has no motivation to participate in the CRP. If the rules for the CRP bidding process are 
known with certainty,  1 ) | ( 1 = - S B H , and  ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ; (
* W R q K q G q E V - - + + = a h p . In this 
                                                 
3 The model developed here can be extended by incorporating the farmer’s input-use decision. Such a model can be 
solved in a two-stage framework. In the first stage, the farmer determines the optimal input use (F) by maximizing 
( ) ) ( ) ; , ( 0 q G F q W EU + + h p   and  then  finds  ( ) ) ( ) *; , ( 0 q G F q W EU + + h p .  In  the  second  stage,  the 
optimal bid is determined using equation (2) with  ( ) ) ( ) *; , ( 0 q G F q W EU + + h p  and  ) *; , ( h p F q E .    8 
case, since any bid below  B  is accepted, the farmer bids at  B  or does not bid. Thus, revealing 
the rules for the CRP bidding process would increase the optimal bid to  B . This also leads the 
farmer with low opportunity costs to bid at B , providing a premium for the farmer.  
Factors Affecting the Optimal Bid  
  We now examine the factors affecting the optimal bid given in (4). The optimal bid is 
positively related to the expected return, the government payments, and the restoration costs. The 
bid  is  negatively  related  to  the  risk  premium  ( 2 ) ( ) ( ) ( p f Var W W R = ).  The  greater  the  risk 
aversion and/or the greater the variability of returns, the higher the risk premium, and therefore 
the lower the optimal bid price ( 0
2
) ( ) | (
*
<
D
- =
p
f
Var S V h
d
dV
 and  0
2
) | (
)) ( (
*
<
D
- =
f
p
S V h
Var d
dV
). 
Risk-averse farmers tend to increase the probability of acceptance by lowering their bids. Under 
risk-neutrality,  [ ] [ ]
) | (
) | ( 1
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ; (
*
*
*
S V h
S V H
q K q G q E V
-
+ - + + = a h p .  These  results  indicate 
that risk-averse farmers usually bid lower than risk-neutral farmers in the CRP.  
We  determine  the  impact  of  an  increase  in  the  environmental  benefit  scores  of  the 
cropland offered to the CRP on the optimal bid by totally differentiating (3) as: 
 
D
W
- =
dS
dV
*
.                                           (5) 
where  [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ( ) 1 (
) | ( ) | ( *
* *
W R q G q E q K V
S
S V h
S
S V H
+ - - - -
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
= W h p a . The sign of (5) 
depends  on  the  sign  of  W.  Given  that  0 > D   and  0
) | (
<
¶
¶
S
E V H
,  0
*
>
dS
dV
  if  0 < W .  This 
condition  holds  when  the  bid  changes  at  a  bounded  rate  and  the  density  does  not  increase 
dramatically in any region of the support. Hence, the higher the environmental scores, the higher   9 
the  optimal  bid.  Ceteris  paribus,  the  farmer  will  bid  higher  for  the  fields  with  the  higher 
environmental scores than the fields with the lower scores.   
  The land quality also affects the farmer participation. Assuming that the environmental 
scores are a function of the land quality,  ) (q S , we examine the impact of an increase in q on the 
optimal bid by totally differentiating (3) as: 
      
D
L + W
¶
¶
- =
) | (
*
* S V h
q
S
dq
dV
                          (6) 
where  0 < W   and  ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
¶
¶
+
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
- - = L
q
q G W R
q
q E
q
q E
q
q K ) ( ) ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) (
) 1 (
p
h p h p
a .  Since 
) ( ) ; ( W R q E > h p , 
p
h p h p
¶
¶
¶
¶
>
¶
¶ ) ( ) ; ( ) ; ( W R
q
q E
q
q E
. Given that  0
) (
>
¶
¶
q
q G
,  0 < L  if  0
) (
³
¶
¶
q
q K
. 
However, if  0
) (
<
¶
¶
q
q K
, we expect  0 < L  because 
q
q K
¶
¶ ) (
 is likely to be small. If  0 ³
¶
¶
q
S
, (6) is 
positive, indicating that the bid is positively  related to the land quality.  If  0 <
¶
¶
q
S
, then the 
impact of an increase in the land quality on the optimal bid is indeterminate because of the two 
countervailing effects of the land quality. Thus, the optimal bid increases with an increase in the 
land quality, unless the land quality is negatively related to the environmental scores.  
Farmer  characteristics  (h )  would  also  affect  the  optimal  bid  through  influencing 
) ; ( h p q E .  The  impact  of  h   on  the  optimal  bid  is  determined  as: 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
¶
¶
-
¶
¶
D
=
p h
h p
h
) (
1
) ; ( ) | (
* * W R q E S V h
d
dV
, which depends on the sign of 
h
h p
¶
¶ ) ; (q E
. Note that 
0 ) (
*
< ³
h d
dV
 if  0 ) (
) ; (
< ³
¶
¶
h
h p q E
. Thus, the optimal bid is positively (negatively) related to a 
farmer characteristic if that characteristic increases (decreases) the expected return.   10 
Denoting  heterogeneity  in  the  land  quality  and  farmer  characteristics  in  a  county  by 
subscripting q and  h  with i, we can state that there will be some farmers with  B Vi £
*  and 
others with  B Vi >
* . In a county, the farmers with  B Vi £
*  will submit their bids to the program 
while the remaining farmers will not bid. Let the farmers be numbered in increasing order by 
their optimal bids, such that 
*
1 V  represents the lowest bid and 
*
N V  represents the highest bid. In a 
county with N farmers, M farmers with  B V V V M £
* *
2
*
1 ,..., ,  will submit their bids to the program 
while the remaining farmers will not bid. After all the farmers submit their bids, the offers with 
B Vi £
*   are  evaluated  and  ranked  using  the  cost-adjusted  environmental  scores  of  the  land 
offered ( i T ). This cost-adjusted index depends on the environmental scores of the EBI and the 
cost factors (farmers’ bids) as:  ) , (
*
i i i S V g T =  with  0
* <
¶
¶
i V
g
 and  0 >
¶
¶
i S
g
. Each eligible offer is 
ranked based on  i T  in comparison to all the other offers and selections are made from that 
ranking. All the offers with the cost-adjusted index higher than the cutoff (threshold) index (
C
i T ) 
are  accepted.  In  the  next  section,  we  develop  an  econometric  model  to  analyze  the  factors 
affecting enrollment in the CRP and the determinants of rental rates received.  
3. Econometric Model 
We  now  develop  a  selectivity-based  econometric  model  to  identify  factors  affecting 
enrollment in the CRP and determinants of rental rates received based on the theoretical analysis. 
Participation by landowners in the CRP is measured using the proportion of county cropland 
enrolled in the CRP (as in Parks and Kramer; Goodwin and Smith). Each county is analyzed as a 
representative farm that possesses the average characteristics of that county. The econometric 
model is used to determine the factors affecting the probability of cropland enrolled in the CRP 
and the rental rates received.    11 
Determinants of Enrollment Probabilities 
  The choice to accept a tract of agricultural land to the CRP depends on whether the cost-
adjusted environmental scores of the land are higher than the threshold scores. Let  ( ) p h, , q T
C
i  
describe  the  per-acre  threshold  cost-adjusted  environmental  scores  relevant  to  county  i.  The 
probability of some parcels drawn from county i, with the vector of observable characteristics 
i x , has a probability of enrolling ( i P ), which is defined as the probability that  ) ( ￿ xi g Ti =  is 
greater than  ( ) p h, , q T
C
i . Here,  ) ( ￿ xi g Ti =  is the cost-adjusted environmental scores of the land 
with the attributes  i x . Note that the vector  i x  would include factors affecting both 
*
i V  and  i S  as 
identified in the theoretical analysis above. These factors consist of land characteristics, land 
quality, expected returns, government payments, socio-economic factors, environmental scores, 
bid cap, and variables related to the variability of returns. The vector  i x  is specified so that the 
probability of a land with the vector of attributes  i x  drawn randomly from the land base enrolled 
in the CRP in county i is  { } ) ( Pr ￿ xi g T P
C
i i £ = , where ￿ is the parameter vector to be estimated. 
This probability is bounded by zero and one. The relationship between  i T  and  i P  is assumed to 
form a standard normal cumulative distribution function
4:  
  { } ( ) ) ( ) ( Pr ￿ x ￿ x i i g g T P
C
i i F = £ = .                                                (7) 
This  yields  the  probit  model  (Johnston  and  Dinardo,  p.  418).  We  solve  (7)  for  ) ( ￿ xi g   to 
approximate the probability with the proportion of the land acres enrolled in the CRP ( i f ) in 
county i. We then use the minimum 
2 c  methods in grouped data to estimate the probability of 
enrollment as (Maddala; Johnston and Dinardo, p. 433-434):    
                                                 
4 An alternative model is to use a tobit specification as in Goodwin and Smith. However, this probit specification 
performed better than the tobit specification.   12 
  ( ) i i u g f + @ F
- ) (
1 ￿ xi .                                                                        (8)  
The  grouping  was  done  across  producers  with  eligible  lands  as  in  Parks  and  Kramer.  The 
parameter vector ￿ is estimated using observations on  i f , which is consistent with the approach 
used by Parks and Kramer. A linear function of parameters is estimated, i.e.,  i u g + = ￿ x ￿ x i i ) ( . 
Maddala’s  correction  was  used  for  the  heteroscedasticity  exhibited  by  i u .  These  parameter 
estimates allow the probability of enrollment in the CRP to be estimated for each county. We 
also calculate the elasticity of probability for some of the explanatory variables.  
Determinants of Rental Rates 
We  use  the  Heckman’s  two-step  estimator  that  considers  a  model  consisting  of  two 
equations (Greene, 1997, p. 974-981). The first equation is the selection equation defined by (7). 
The  second  equation  is  the  linear  model  of  the  determinants  of  rental  rates  received: 
i i e y + = ￿ z i , where yi is the rental payment received by farmers, b b b b is a vector of parameters to 
be estimated, zi is a vector of exogenous variables, and ei is a random disturbance with the 
variance 
2 s . Let the correlation between ei and  i u  be represented by r .    
  A selectivity problem arises because yi is observed only when  0 > i f  and the observed 
rental rates represent the accepted bids. In such a situation, the ordinary least squares estimator 
of b b b b is biased and inconsistent. A consistent estimator is the two-step procedure suggested by 
Heckman  and  clarified  by  Greene  (1981).  The  basis  for  this  estimation  procedure  is  the 
conditional regression function: 
[ ] i i i i i v v f y E y + + = + > = g bg ￿ z i 0 |                          (9)   13 
where  rs bg = , 
) (
) (
￿ x
￿ x
i
i
F
=
f
g i  is the inverse Mill’s ratio, f(×) is the standard normal probability 
density function evaluated at the argument, F(×) is the cumulative distribution function for a 
standard normal random variable evaluated at the argument, and vi  is the random disturbance. 
Because  the  regression  error  vi  is  heteroskedastic,  the  standard  errors  of  the  regression  are 
obtained  by  using  the  methods  proposed  by  Heckman  and  Greene  (1981)  who  derive  the 
covariance  matrices  in  selectivity  models.  First,  we  use  the  standard  Heckman  two-step 
estimation procedure to estimate equations (8) and (9). Those estimators are consistent, but may 
not  be  fully  efficient.  Thus,  we  also  estimate  the  models  using  maximum  likelihood  as  in 
Détang-Dessendre et al. In this case, we do not estimate  rs bg =   but rather  r  and  s  (the 
estimation is done in one step) (Détang-Dessendre et al.). Identification problems may arise in 
sample selection analysis using two-step regression. When the elements of xi are the same as, or 
a subset of, the elements of zi, it is only the nonlinearity of 
) ￿ x (
) ￿ x (
i
i
F
f
 as a function of  ￿ xi  that 
makes the parameters of the second step regression identifiable (Davidson and MacKinnon, p. 
545). 
4. Data 
Enrollment in the CRP is measured using the proportion of the cropland enrolled in the 
CRP during the signup 20 in 2000. The data covers all the counties in the United States that have 
CRP land up to that signup period. Of the 1,729 counties in the data set, the bids from 1,577 
counties were accepted during the signup 20. This cross-section data is merged at the county 
level  with  the  economic,  climate  condition,  land  quality,  and  farmer  characteristics  data 
identified in the theoretical analysis. Descriptive statistics of the data used in the estimation are 
presented in Table 1. To be eligible for the CRP participation the land must be: (a) cropland that   14 
was planted or considered planted to an agricultural commodity on hydric soils; or (b) marginal 
pastureland that is suitable for practices such as riparian buffers, filter strips, grassed waterways, 
or field windbreaks. Eligible land data are obtained from the 1997 National Resources Inventory.  
The data on the land acres enrolled in the CRP during the signup 20 of the CRP are 
obtained from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency (FSA). The average rental 
rates (RENT), maximum acceptable rental rate (MAXBID) and the average EBI of each county 
were  also  obtained  from  Farm  Service  Agency.  Farm  Service  Agency  bases  the  maximum 
acceptable  rental  rates  on  the  relative  productivity  of  the  soils  within  each  county  and  the 
average of the past 3 years of dryland cash rent or cash-rent equivalent rental rates adjusted for 
site-specific, soil-based productivity factors.  
The EBI also plays a role in determining suitability of the land for enrollment in the CRP. 
The EBI depends on six environmental factors and a cost component. The environmental factors 
are determined based on the following point system: wildlife habitat benefits, 0-100 points; water 
quality benefits, 0-100 points; on-farm benefits, 0-100 points; long-term benefits, 0-50 points; air 
quality  benefits,  0-35  points;  and  conservation  priority  area,  0-25  points  (FSA).  The  cost 
component  of  the  EBI  consists  of  15  points  for  requested  rental  payment  relative  to  the 
maximum  acceptable  payment  for  soils  offered,  10  points  if  no  cost-share  for  cover 
establishment  is  requested,  and  up  to  125  points  depending  on  the  per-acre  rental  payments 
requested. We use only the total environmental component of the EBI to avoid endogeneity 
associated with the cost component in the estimations.    
  The opportunity cost of participation in the CRP for farmers is made up of the returns 
from crop production and farm program payments. The data related to the opportunity cost are 
obtained from the 1997 U.S. Census of Agriculture. This data include revenues, production costs, 
and government payments. Crop revenues per acre (VALCROP) consist of the value of crops   15 
sold in a county. Crop costs per acre (COST) include the costs of seed, fertilizers, chemical, 
petroleum, electricity, labor, and other customwork costs. Per-acre government payments other 
than the CRP payments received by farmers (GOVPAY) are also considered as opportunity costs 
of participation. We also calculate the proportions of cropland allocated to corn and soybeans 
(CORNSOY), wheat, barley and oats (WHBR), and rice and cotton (RICOT) production in each 
county. These variables are used to take into account the impacts of regional differences in crop 
production patterns on the participation decision and rental rates received. 
  Land quality indices for each county include the proportion of land in Land Capability 
Classes (LCCs) I and II, the slope of the agricultural land (SLOPE), and the proportion of the 
cropland irrigated (IRLAND). These measures are obtained from the 1997 National Resources 
Inventory data base. LCCs I and II represent well-suited land for crop production. The vector h  
for a county includes the characteristics of land users in the county. Farmer characteristics for a 
county from the 1997 U.S. Census of Agriculture include the average age of the farm operators 
(AGE) and the proportion of the cropland operated by full-time owners (FULL) in that county.    
We use the mean temperature (MTEM) and precipitation (MPER) as indicators of climate 
condition in each county. As an alternative measure of climate condition, we also employ a 
drought index, Palmer Drought Severity Index (MPAL). This is a meteorological drought index 
indicating the severity of dry or wet spells of weather. It is based on the principles of a balance 
between moisture supply and demand. The index generally ranges from -6 to 6, with negative 
values denoting dry spells and positive values indicating wet spells. These variables are included 
in the analysis because they are likely to affect the expect returns. To take into account the 
impacts of the risk premium of crop production, we estimate the variability of climate variables. 
The standard deviations of temperature (STEM), precipitation (SPER), and the drought index 
(SPAL) are calculated using the time series data for each county. The climate data is obtained   16 
from the National Climatic Data Center. The variability of the climate variables could serve as a 
proxy for the variability of agricultural returns.  
5. Results 
Factors Affecting Enrollment Probabilities 
  Table 2 presents the results of two alternative models for the determinants of proportion 
of the cropland enrolled in the CRP. Model I includes the precipitation and temperature levels as 
climate  variables  and  their  standard  deviation  as  a  proxy  for  the  variability  of  agricultural 
returns. We also use an alternative measure of an indicator for climate conditions, the drought 
index. Model II includes the drought index and its standard deviation instead of the precipitation 
and temperature levels and their standard deviation.  
Most of the variables in the estimated models are statistically significant. The climate 
variables and their variability are found to impact the enrollment probabilities in the CRP. The 
mean temperature (MTEM) has a negative impact and the mean precipitation (MPER) has a 
positive  impact  on  the  participation  probabilities.  As  a  proxy  for  the  uncertainty  about 
agricultural production, we include the variability of climate variables in Model I. The variability 
of  temperature  (STEM)  and  precipitation  (SPER)  positively  impacts  the  participation 
probabilities. The estimated elasticities of these variables are 0.93 and 0.28, respectively. These 
results  are  consistent  with  the  analytical  results  obtained  above.  The  standard  deviation  of 
agricultural profits is likely to increase with an increase in the variability of climate variables. An 
increase in the variability increases the risk premium, reducing the threshold rental rates required 
to participate in the program. As an alternative measure of climate condition, we also employ 
Palmer Drought Index (MPAL) and its variability (SPAL) (Model II). Similarly, the variability 
of this index has a positive impact on the enrollment probabilities. The estimated elasticities of 
MPAL and SPAL are 0.12 and 0.14, respectively   17 
As expected, the bid cap (MAXBID) has positive impacts on the proportion of cropland 
enrolled in the CRP. This result occurs because the CRP contracts are accepted based on a 
county-level bid cap that is calculated in advance of enrollment. The bid cap is included to 
explain participation decisions because they influence the farmer’s bidding strategies as shown in 
the  theoretical  analysis  above.  The  probability  is  inelastic  with  respect  to  MAXBID.  The 
elasticities of MAXBID for Model I and for Model II are 0.60 and 0.75, respectively. 
An increase in the agricultural benefits from crop production is expected to decrease the 
probability of enrollment in the CRP because it increases the opportunity costs of participation in 
the  program.  In  the  estimated  models,  this  corresponds  to  increases  in  the  value  of  crop 
production  (VALCROP)  or  decreases  in  the  crop  production  costs  (COST).  The  negative 
coefficients  for  VALCROP  and  the  positive  coefficient  for  COST  are  consistent  with  these 
interpretations. This indicates that increases in the value of crop production and/or decreases in 
the production costs reduce the probability of enrollment in the CRP. The estimated elasticities 
of  VALCROP  for  Model  I  and  Model  II  are  -1.06  and  -0.86,  respectively.  The  estimated 
elasticities of the probability for COST in these models are 0.84 and 0.66, respectively.    
The government payments (GOVPAY) are also included as a measure of the opportunity 
costs  of  enrollment  in  the  CRP.  The  negative  and  statistically  significant  coefficient  for 
GOVPAY indicates that government payments received by farmers have a negative impact on 
the  participation  decision.  This  result  is  expected  because  these  payments  increase  the 
opportunity costs of crop production and therefore the opportunity costs of participation in the 
CRP. However, the enrollment probability is found to be inelastic with respect to the government 
payments (Table 2). The elasticity of probability with respect to this variable is found to be about 
-0.12 for all the estimated models.      18 
We include the proportions of cropland allocated to corn and soybeans (CORNSOY), 
wheat, barley and oats (WHBR), and rice and cotton (RICOT) productions to take into account 
the impacts of regional differences in crop production patterns
5. The coefficients on the variables 
for CORNSOY and RICOT are negative and statistically significant, while the coefficients of 
WHBR are positive for all the estimated models, but statistically significant only in Model I. 
These results indicate that the proportion of the cropland enrolled in the CRP are higher in the 
counties  with  higher  wheat  and  barley  productions  as  well  as  higher  corn  and  soybean 
productions,  and  the  enrollment  probabilities  are  lower  in  the  counties  with  higher  rice  and 
cotton productions. The elasticity of these variables is found to be about 0.10, indicating that the 
probability  of  enrollment  is  inelastic  with  respect  to  these  variables.  The  coefficient  on  the 
proportion  of  the  cropland  irrigated  (IRLAND)  is  negative  and  statistically  significant.  This 
indicates that irrigated land is less likely to be enrolled in the CRP than nonirrigated land. 
As soil quality and environmental quality variables, the proportion of the land in LCCs I 
and II and the EBI are included in the estimations. LCCs I and II measure the land’s suitability 
for crop production. The negative coefficient on LCCs indicates that the proportion of the land in 
LCCs I and II is negatively related to the enrollment in the CRP. The EBI in a county is included 
as an environmental quality indicator of that county. The proportion of the land enrolled in the 
CRP in a country could depend on the EBI rankings of that county. This is because the CRP 
contracts are selected by taking into account the EBI rankings of the cropland offered to the 
CRP. The coefficient on the EBI is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for all the 
estimated models. The positive coefficient for the EBI shows that the probability of enrollment is 
positively related to the EBI. This result is consistent with the actual implementation of the 
                                                 
5 We also estimated the models with dummy variables included for production regions. We do not present the results 
from these models because the results are similar to those reported in Table 2.   19 
program  in  which  contracts  are  accepted  based  on  the  EBI  rankings  relative  to  costs.  The 
probability of enrollment in the CRP is found to be elastic with respect to the EBI for all the 
estimated models. The elasticity of probability is 1.15 for Model I and 1.45 for Model II.      
We also examine the impacts of socioeconomic factors on the enrollment probabilities. 
Older farmers are expected to participate more in the CRP as a means of partial retirement. It is 
also reasonable to expect that counties with higher proportions of full-time landowners should 
have  lower  participation  rates.  These  expectations  are  consistent  with  the  estimated  positive 
coefficient  on  the  average  age  (AGE)  and  negative  coefficient  on  the  proportions  of  land 
operated by full-time owners (FULL). The probability of enrollment is elastic with respect to 
AGE and it is inelastic with respect to FULL. These results indicate that older farmers and higher 
proportions of land operated by part-time owners have higher enrollment probabilities. These 
results are consistent with the previous studies examining the factors affecting participation in 
the  CRP  and  wetland  reserve  programs  (McLean,  Hui,  and  Joseph;  Kalaitzandonakes  and 
Monson; Parks and Kramer).  
We tested the potential endogeneity of some of the variables used in the estimations of 
the models presented in Table 2. To test the endogeneity of the variables, we use a two-step 
procedure described by Wooldridge (p. 474). This procedure determines whether some of the 
variables  are  endogenous  and/or  whether  endogeneity  has  any  effect  on  consistency  of  their 
estimate. To determine whether the variable x2 is endogenous, we first run the ordinary least 
squares regression x2 on other independent variables and save the residual (v). Second, we re-
estimate (8) with the residual v included as an additional independent variable. We then test the 
null  hypothesis  that  x2  is  exogenous  in  the  estimated  model  by  determining  whether  the 
coefficient on v is equal to zero. The results indicate that the null hypothesis of exogeneity can 
not be rejected for all the variables tested in the models presented in Table 2.   20 
Determinants of Rental Payments 
Table  3  presents  the  results  of  two  alternative  models  (Model  I  and  II)  for  the 
determinants of rental rates received. These models correspond to the determinants of enrollment 
probabilities presented in Table 2. As the estimation with maximum of likelihood improves the 
efficiency without changing the value of the estimated coefficients, we present the result of this 
estimation  method  in  Table  3  for  all  factors  and  we  just  add  the  estimated  coefficient  g b  
obtained by the Heckman method. The estimated models fit the data quite well. The R
2 is 0.67 
for Model I and 0.66 for Model II.  The results also indicate that the null hypothesis of no sample 
selection bias (i.e.,  0 = g b  and  0 = r  in ML estimation) is rejected for all the estimated models
6.  
The  climate  variables  and  their  variability  are  expected  to  impact  the  rental  rates 
received. The estimated models show that the mean temperature (MTEM) has a positive impact 
and the mean precipitation (MPER) has a negative impact on the rental rates received (Model I). 
The variability of temperature (STEM) and precipitation (SPER) has negative impacts on the 
rental  rates.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the  analytical  results  obtained  above.  The 
variability  of  returns  from  agricultural  production  is  positively  related  to  the  risk  premium, 
reducing the threshold rental rates required to participate in the program. These results also hold 
with  the  Palmer  Drought  Index  (MPAL)  and  its  variability  (SPAL)  (Model  II).  Thus,  the 
variability of return from agricultural production would likely reduce the certainty equivalent 
income and therefore the rental rates received. 
The estimated coefficient for the maximum allowable bid (MAXBID) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for all the estimated models. The county-level bid cap 
influences farmers’ participation decisions and the rental rates received because it influences 
                                                 
6 We also tested the potential endogeneity of some of the variables used in the estimations of the models presented 
in Table 3. The results indicate that there is no evidence suggesting the endogeneity for the variables used in the 
estimations.   21 
farmers’ bidding strategies as shown in the theoretical model. The elasticities of MAXBID for 
Model I and Model II are 0.68 and 0.67, respectively. An increase in the agricultural benefits 
from crop production increases the rental rates received because it raises the opportunity costs of 
participation in the CRP. The estimated models indicate that increases in the value from crop 
production (VALCROP) and/or decreases in the production costs (COST) increase the rental 
rates.  The  positive  and  statistically  significant  coefficient  for  GOVPAY  indicates  that 
government payments have a positive impact on the rental rates received. This indicates that 
government payments raise the rental rates received through increasing the opportunity costs of 
participation in the CRP. 
The  coefficient  on  the  EBI  for  all  the  estimated  models  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the EBI is positively related to the rental rates 
received. These results reveal that the lands with higher environmental benefits receive higher 
rental payments. The slope has a positive impact on the observed rental rates, indicating that the 
land with higher slope is likely to have higher rental rates. An increase in the proportion of the 
land in LCCs I and II categories is expected to increase the rental rates received. The positive 
coefficient  for  the  proportion  of  LCCs  I  and  II  is  consistent  with  this  interpretation.  The 
proportion of cropland irrigated will affect the rental rates received. The coefficient on IRLAND 
is  positive  and  statistically  significant,  indicating  that  the  proportion  of  land  irrigated  is 
positively related to the rental rates received.  
We also consider socioeconomic factors as the determinants of rental rates received in the 
estimated models (Table 3). These variables would likely affect the rental rates through either 
affecting the opportunity costs of participation or farmers’ perceptions about the CRP bidding 
process and rules. The coefficient on the age (AGE) is not statistically significant. On the other 
hand, the coefficients on the full-time owners (FULL) for all the estimated models are negative   22 
and statically significant, indicating that the rental rates received are negatively related to the 
proportion of the cropland operated by the full-time owners. These results could be because 
counties with the high full-time owners would likely participate less in the CRP and the lands 
they offer for the CRP are likely to have low opportunity costs of participation.    
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the factors affecting farmers’ participation strategies when deciding 
to  enroll  in  the  CRP  under  uncertainty.  It  develops  a  theoretical  model  of  farmer  decision-
making  to  investigate  the  impacts  of  various  factors  on  the  optimal  bidding  strategies.  A 
selectivity-based econometric model is then used to estimate the probability of enrollment in the 
CRP and determinants of rental payments.  The results from the theoretical model show that the 
optimal bid increases with an increase in the farming income and environmental benefits of the 
land and with a decrease in the risk aversion and variability of returns. The econometric model 
determines  the  factors  affecting  the  probability  of  enrollment  and  the  determinants  of  the 
observed  rental  rates.  The  results  show  that increases  in  production  costs  and  bid  caps,  and 
decreases in value of crop production have positive impacts on the participation decisions. Lands 
with  higher  environmental  benefit  index  have  a  higher  probability  of  enrollment  and  higher 
rental rates. The variability of climate variables positively impacts the enrollment probabilities 
and negatively impacts the rental rates received.  
The results from this study have policy implications for the design and implementation of 
conservation  programs  promoting  shifts  in  behavior,  farm  programs  that  cope  with  various 
sources of uncertainty, and development of estimates of environmental program performance. 
Environmental policies are increasingly relying on the use of land retirement and conversion 
programs  to  reduce  adverse  impacts  of  agricultural  production  practices.  Incorporating 
uncertainty  in  analyzing  conservation  programs  is  important  not  only  to  design  appropriate   23 
incentive payments but also to examine costs and benefits of such programs. Success of land 
retirement and conservation programs depends on appropriate design of land rental payments and 
environmental benefit instruments. The results also emphasize the implications of farm programs 
and policies that reduce various sources of uncertainty for farmer participation in land retirement 
programs.  Such  policies  would  include  price  support  programs,  crop  insurance,  or  future 
markets. Thus, these policies could have impacts on encouraging production on erodible land 
and  reduce  CRP  participation.  Additionally,  the  results  underscore  the  importance  of 
incorporating uncertainty and risk preferences in cost-benefit analysis of conservation programs, 
targeting farmers with high environmental benefits, and improving the environmental benefit 
instruments to better target those farmers.  
This paper focused on the impact of uncertainty on farmers’ participation strategies when 
deciding to enroll in the CRP. Future work should focus on extending the theoretical analysis to 
incorporate other decisions such as input use and land allocations into this model.  This paper 
also used the weather variability as a proxy for the variability of agricultural returns. Developing 
alternative measures of uncertainty for agricultural returns and analyzing how different sources 
of  uncertainty  affect  farmer  participation  as  well  as  incorporating  multiple  outputs  in  the 
theoretical model are important future research topics in this area. Since the model developed in 
this paper is a single period model and CRP contracts involve multi year commitments, future 
research should incorporate the impacts of intertemporal nature of participation decision.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Data Used in the Estimations 
 
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. Dev 
ADOPT  Percentage of Cropland in the CRP  0.034  0.238 
RENT  Rental Rates Received ($/Acre)  54.875       23.336      
MAXBID  Maximum Allowable Bid ($/Acre)  60.627       24.589      
EBI  Environmental Benefit Index  192.120       26.681      
SLOPE  Average Slope (%)  1.188  0.985 
LCCs  Proportion of Land in LCCs I and II  0.350  0.164 
IRLAND  Proportion of Irrigated Land  0.079  0.163 
VALCROP  Value of Crop Production ($/Acre)  552.390  1309.100 
COST  Cost of Production ($/Acre)  418.610  735.680 
GOVPAY  Government Payments ($/Acre)  16.310  7.788 
AGE  Average Age of Farmers (Years)  54.103  2.160 
FULL  Percentage of Full-time Farmers  56.494  12.937 
CORNSOY  Percentage of Land in Corn and Soybeans  53.373  33.780 
WHBR  Percentage of Land in Wheat, Barley, and Oats  26.492  22.386 
RICOT  Percentage of Land in Rice and Cotton  6.030  15.075 
MTEM  Average Temperature (Fahrenheit)  53.621  7.708 
MPER  Average Precipitation (Inches)  3.084  0.988 
STEM  Standard Deviation of Temperature  2.611  0.713 
SPER  Standard Deviation of Precipitation  0.633  0.233 
MPAL  Palmer Drought Index  0.099  0.273 
SPAL  Standard Deviation of Palmer Drought Index  1.784  0.360 
Note: Number of observations is 1,729. 
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Table 2. Estimated Grouped Probit Models of Enrollment Probabilities  
  Model I  Model II 
Variable  Estimate  Std. 
Error 
Elast.  Estimate  Std. 
Error 
Elast. 
MAXBID  0.006***  0.001  0.60  0.007***  0.001  0.75 
EBI  2.221***  0.160  1.15  2.646***  0.141  1.45 
SLOPE  -0.339***  0.031  -0.46  -0.424***  0.033  -0.65 
LCCs  -1.095***  0.172  -0.28  -1.296***  0.173  -0.36 
IRLAND  -0.336*  0.190  -0.07  -0.731***  0.186  -0.15 
VALCROP  -0.001***  0.0002  -1.06  -0.001***  0.0002  -0.86 
COST  0.001***  0.0003  0.84  0.001***  0.0003  0.66 
GOVPAY  -0.003  0.002  -0.12  0.004**  -0.002  -0.13 
AGE  0.071***  0.012  2.39  0.073***  0.012  1.75 
FULL  -0.011***  0.003  -0.36  -0.007***  0.003  -0.53 
CORNSOY  -0.003***  0.001  -0.08  -0.002**  0.001  -0.01 
WHBR  0.009***  0.002  0.09  0.003  0.002  0.04 
RICOT  -0.009***  0.002  -0.11  -0.009***  0.002  -0.11 
MTEM  -0.014**  0.007  -0.98  -  -  - 
MPER  0.446***  0.060  1.33  -  -  - 
STEM  0.108**  0.053  0.93  -  -  - 
SPER  0.586***  0.176  0.28  -  -  - 
MPAL  -  -  -  0.654***  0.105  0.12 
SPAL  -  -  -  0.741***  0.112  0.14 
CONSTANT  -3.903***  0.657  -  -1.846**  0.833  - 
R
2  0.61      0.59     
Log of Likelihood   -187.572      -184.847     
Note: ***, **, and * indicates that the parameter is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   26 
 Table 3. Selectivity-Corrected Determinants of Rental Rates 
  Model I  Model II 
Variable  Estimate  Std. 
Error 
Elast.  Estimate  Std. 
Error 
Elast. 
MAXBID  0.616***  0.019  0.68  0.608***  0.018  0.67 
EBI  0.291***  0.014  1.02  0.298***  0.014  1.04 
SLOPE  0.893**  0.426  0.02  0.885**  0.424  0.12 
LCCs  -9.300***  2.922  -0.14  -8.729***  2.911  -0.14 
IRLAND  5.635**  2.467  0.11  4.376*  2.495  0.11 
VALCROP  0.003***  0.001  0.13  0.004***  0.001  0.14 
COST  -0.007***  0.002  -0.15  -0.008***  0.002  -0.16 
GOVPAY  0.317***  0.042  0.09  0.316***  0.043  0.09 
AGE  -0.007  0.245  -0.01  0.158  0.214  0.16 
FULL  -0.153***  0.042  -0.16  -0.199***  0.040  -0.20 
CORNSOY  0.019  0.012  0.02  0.008  0.010  0.01 
WHBR  0.070***  0.023  0.02  0.082***  0.022  0.02 
RICOT  0.074***  0.025  0.01  0.066**  0.026  0.01 
MTEM  0.237**  0.102  0.23  -  -  - 
MPER  -3.712***  0.750  -0.21  -  -  - 
STEM  -1.173**  0.671  -0.06  -  -  - 
SPER  -1.791  2.279  -0.02  -  -  - 
MPAL  -  -  -  2.659  2.032  0.17 
SPAL  -  -  -  -1.708  1.542  -0.16 
r   -0.634***  0.243  -  -0.669***  0.257  - 
s   0.931***  0.345  -  0.964***  0.357  - 
￿￿  -0.591***  0.235  -  -0.646***  0.240  - 
CONSTANT  -33.100***  11.751  -  -44.086***  12.50  - 
R
2  0.67      0.66     
Note: ***, **, and * indicates that the parameter is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
As the estimation with maximum of likelihood improves the efficiency without changing the value of the estimated 
coefficients, we give the result of this estimation method for all factors and we just add the estimated coefficient of 
￿￿ obtained by the Heckman method.   27 
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